CED v3.2.1 — Chapter 3.2 + Chapter 14.7

Coalition Mechanics & Enforcement Simulator

CED does not require universal adoption to generate impact. A minimum viable coalition controls sufficient economic leverage to make non-compliance untenable for virtually every nation. Model enforcement scenarios by adjusting coalition coverage, deforestation rate, CPP price, and CGCI zone. All computation is client-side — no server round-trip.

Minimum Coalition US + EU + China + 10
Economic Leverage 70% Global GDP
Trade Coverage 60% Int'l Trade
Sanctions Capacity 90% Effective

Coalition Configuration Scenarios

Four validated coalition configurations modelled in CED v3.2.1, Chapter 14.7. Each generates measurable impact. Partial coalitions create a ratchet effect — compliance premiums, infrastructure lock-in, and FATF-precedent signalling drive progressive expansion toward full coverage.

–
Insufficient
< 19% GDP
Below minimum viable threshold
Deforestation reduction: 0–2%
CPP: —
No enforcement capacity
A
Minimum Viable
18–22% trade
EU + Singapore + EFTA
Deforestation reduction: 8–15%
CPP: US$60–90B/yr
Level 1–2 only
B
Strong Coalition
45–55% trade
EU + G7 aligned nations
Deforestation reduction: 35–50%
CPP: US$200–300B/yr
Level 1–3 operational
C
Dominant Coalition
65–75% trade
G7 + China or India
Deforestation reduction: 55–70%
CPP: US$350–430B/yr
Level 4 active
D
Full Specification
70%+ global trade
Full CED design coalition
Deforestation reduction: 70–90%
CPP: US$437B/yr
Full L0–L5 operational

Enforcement Coalition Economic Leverage

Metric Permanent Members (US + EU + China + India) Full Coalition (Target) Enforcement Implication
Global GDP Coverage ~67% 70%+ Market access denial is economically devastating for any excluded nation
International Trade ~55% 60% No nation survives Level 4 exclusion from this trade volume
Financial Markets ~75% 80% Credit and capital access controlled for 80% of global flows
Sanctions Capacity ~85% 90% 9 of 10 dollars in effective sanction infrastructure within coalition
Development Finance ~88% 90% Infrastructure investment contingent on CGCI compliance certification
Interactive Enforcement Simulator

CED Economic Formula Engine

Adjust parameters to compute enforcement cost, non-compliance cost, and deforestation reduction projections. Formulae derived from CED v3.2.1 Chapters 7.4, 8.2, and 14.7. All computation is client-side.

Input Parameters
5% Scenario A (19%) Scenario D (70%) 100%
0.1M Global ~10M/yr 15M
US$200 Congo US$250 | Amazon US$500 SE Asia US$650
CPP rates are set at opportunity cost of most profitable destructive use. Certainty eliminates risk premium — 30-year rolling contract, no bid-ask spread.
Enforcement Analysis
Scenario B
62.0% GDP
Strong coalition. Full Level 1–3 operational.
Annual CPP Cost
US$2.5B/yr
CPP rate × deforestation area. Guarantees preservation income equal to destruction profit for all registered landholders.
Enforcement Level
Full Level 1–3 operational
Maximum enforcement level achievable at current coalition coverage. Higher GDP coverage unlocks Level 4 and Level 5 capabilities.
Non-Compliance Cost (Target Nation)
US$98B/yr
Estimated Phase 3C enforcement cost scaled from CED Chapter 7.4 (Brazil: US$70B/yr per 5M ha). Adjusted for coalition leverage multiplier.
Cost-Benefit Ratio
39.2:1
Resistance cost ÷ compliance cost. CED mandates minimum 10:1 for compliance to be the only rational economic choice.
Projected Deforestation Reduction
35–50%
Reduction range based on validated coalition scenario modelling. CED v3.2.1, Chapter 14.7 — partial coalitions create ratchet effect.
Carbon Avoided
0.70 GtCO₂/yr
Estimated at 200 tCO₂/ha for tropical forest preservation. Upper bound of reduction range applied.
Compliance Determination
Adjust parameters above to generate compliance determination.

Coalition Formation Sequence

Enforcement coalitions do not require simultaneous universal adoption. FATF began with 16 members. The WTO began with 23. Both achieved near-universal participation through structural economic consequences of non-participation — identical to CED's design logic.

Phase Timeline Coalition State Trade Coverage Key Actions Success Criteria
Phase 0 — Sandbox Months 0–12 Singapore Data Hub. 2–3 forest nations. — CED monitoring validated. First CPP payments. EUDR interoperability. >95% accuracy. CPP operational. 2+ bilateral agreements.
Phase 1 — Anchor Months 6–18 EU + Singapore formal endorsement. G7-aligned accession. 20%+ 5+ banks accept CED certification. ISC constituted. First L1–2 actions. 20%+ trade coverage. Enforcement demonstrated.
Phase 2 — Expansion Months 12–30 Full Scenario B coalition. Leakage substantially closed. 40–55% Full escalation ladder. CPP scaled to US$150–250B/yr. 70–80% compliance rate. Measurable deforestation reduction.
Phase 3 — Critical Mass Months 24–42 Scenario C. China and/or India engaged via food/water security. 60–75% CED compliance standard on major commodity exchanges. 85–90% compliance. 55–70% deforestation reduction.
Phase 4 — Maturity Months 36–60 Scenario D. Full CED operational capacity. 70%+ Full CPP (US$437B/yr). System self-sustaining. 90–95% compliance. 70–90% deforestation reduction.
Historical precedent: WTO (23 → 164 members over 48 years), FATF (16 → 200+ jurisdictions over 35 years). CED projects critical mass in 24–42 months — aggressive relative to precedent but validated by existing EUDR infrastructure and the urgent climate timeline. — CED v3.2.1, Chapter 14.6